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The Agency Advantage of Debt Over the
Lifecycle of the Firm
Ed Vos
Carolyn Forlong

The question of an ‘optimal’ capital structure of a firm has been studied for publicly
listed businesses for years. From these studies, agency theory has emerged as a good
way to understand a firm’s capital structure. This paper empirically examines the role
that agency theory plays in determining the capital structure of businesses as they move
from being small unlisted businesses to newly listed on the stock exchange, to being
mature listed businesses. The paper finds that debt has a negative agency advantage
(defined as reducing agency costs of equity) for small businesses, a significant but
minor advantage at the IPO stage, and a significant advantage at the mature listed stage.

I. INTRODUCTION
While it is generally accepted that debt financing is relevant to shareholder wealth,
it is not known exactly how the role of debt financing changes at various stages of
the firm’s development. Several capital structure theories have been developed
and are based on the existence of market imperfections such as agency costs, taxes,
bankruptcy costs and asymmetrical information. However, most of the discussion
of these capital structure theories has been made with reference to listed businesses
and it is uncertain how leverage relationships might differ at other stages of the
business life cycle.
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the agency advantage of debt
over the life cycle of the business. The agency advantage of debt is interpreted as
the degree that debt benefits the firm by reducing the agency costs of equity. We
expect that the changing ownership structures over the firm life cycle will cause
the role of leverage to shift also, particularly at the small business stage where
there is less separation between manager and owner, and at the IPO stage where a
firm undergoes a process of greater diffusion of ownership.
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Consequently, we have divided the finn life cycle into three stages: the small
business, the initial public offering (IPO), and the mature-listed stage. For the pur
pose of this study, we define small businesses as unlisted businesses where the
owner is also the manager of the firm. IPO firms are firms which have Usted on the
stock exchange in the past year. Mature listed firms are those which have been
listed on the stock exchange for five or more years.
Before testing the agency advantage of debt at the three stages, this paper
reviews the current financial literature in order to understand capital structure the
ories based on mature listed firms and the different characteristics of small busi
nesses and IPO firms. The report then outlines the empirical tests of leverage in
four data sets and comes to a conclusion about the changing agency advantage of
debt. That is, the changing degree that debt benefits the owners by reducing agency
costs of equity in small businesses, IPO firms and mature listed businesses.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Capital Structure Theory and Mature Listed Firms
Many studies have examined the benefits of leverage since the famous
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (1958). The irrelevance proposition
states that, in a perfect world without taxes, changes in leverage should have no
effect on a firm’s value. However, the existence of market imperfections has led
financial theorists to agree that an optimal capital structure does exist for each
firm. There are four generally accepted theories which explain the significance of
debt in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetrical information, and
agency costs. These theories have all been tested and have found to be relevant to
large listed businesses.
First, there is evidence that debt creates a tax shield advantage through interest
payments, and this advantage is balanced by the cost of bankruptcy. This theory
was supported by De Angelo and Masulis (1980) who found that capital structure
in listed firms is related to the tax shield of debt. This idea is also supported by
Givoly, Hayne, Ofer, and Sarig (1992) who documented a positive relationship
between the debt ratio and tax rate changes. However, Homaifar, Zietz and Benkato (1994) find that the debt ratio relationship with the tax shield is only observ
able in the long term, whereas Bayless and Diltz (1994) conclude that firms do not
appear to be motivated by the tax advantage of debt. Therefore, while the tax
advantage of debt is a simple and intuitive theory, the evidence suggests that there
are many other considerations determining a firm’s optimal capital structure.
Second, the information hypothesis, popularized by Ross (1977), suggests that
managers use capital structure to signal information about the firm’s expected
future cashflows and operating risk. This hypothesis is confirmed by many
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studies' which have documented stock price increases when leverage increasing
decisions are announced. The information hypothesis argues that this effect occurs
due to asynmietrical information between managers and shareholders, and sug
gests that managers are signalling information about the firm’s capacity to meet
future interest payments.^
The information gap between management and shareholders leads to a third
theory by Myers (1984) known as the pecking order hypothesis. This hypothesis
suggests that managers will first seek to finance assets with the lowest cost financ
ing available. Myers argues that managers will issue the least risky security avail
able in order to reduce costs when new debt or equity is underpriced by
uninformed investors. This theory implies that asymmetrical information leads to
a hierarchy of preferred financing according to the relative costs of each security.
The pecking order hypothesis is supported by Bayless and Diltz (1994) who
found that debt is more likely to be issued after a fall in interest rates, and equity is
more likely to be issued when a firm’s growth opportunities are high. Bayless and
Diltz conclude that equity offerings are timed for favorable market conditions,
when the cost of equity becomes cheaper than additional debt. Thus they provide
evidence that relative costs of each financial instrument are motivating factors in
the use of financing.
Finally, the agency theory focuses on how the gap between management and
ownership can lead to conflicting interests between managers, bond holders, and
owners. This theory is based on the idea that managers will not always act in the
best interests of the investors. For instance, managers may seek to consume “per
quisites” and decrease their work load if the cost of doing so is mainly absorbed by
the investor. Consequently, agency costs consist of the monitoring, bonding, and
auditing of managerial performance by both debt holders and shareholders.
Agency theory proposes that debt reduces agency costs incurred by shareholders
through increased managerial monitoring and pressure to meet interest payments.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were one of the first to suggest that debt forces
agents to take more care with their investments and that it reduces agency costs by
performing a monitoring role valuable to investors. They argue that the existence
of agency costs for both debt and equity results in an optimal capital structure
which minimizes the combined agency costs. The agency theory is also supported
by Grossman and Hart (1982), who argue that financial leverage can reduce
agency costs by increasing the possibility of bankruptcy and providing a manage
rial discipline.
Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) confirmed that debt enhances man
agerial decision making by finding that firms with higher leverage outperform oth
ers in the acquisition market. Ofek and Eli (1993) also found that leverage
increases the probability of operational and financial actions, such as labor cut
backs, in the first year of financial distress.
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In summary, debt does not only play a role in providing an additional source
of funds, but it also benefits mature listed firms through reducing asymmetrical
information, creating a tax shield, improving managerial efficiency and reducing
agency costs.
The Small Business Difference
As the empirical research on small business capital structure has been limited,^
it is difficult to determine whether these theories discussed above are applicable to
small businesses. Most theorists agree that small businesses are impacted by tax
shields, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetries to a different
degree. For example, Pettit and Singer (1985) argue that small businesses experi
ence a greater impact of bankruptcy, monitoring costs, and information asymmetry
in comparison to large businesses.
There are three popular theories which help us to understand the role of debt in
small firms. These theories are outlined below and suggest that the benefits and
risks of debt are likely to be quite different in small businesses. In particular it is
expected that external funding is less available, suffers from higher agency costs
and reduces the independence and utility of the owner.
First, the “finance gap” theory suggests that small firms often find external
funds more costly and less available. Groves and Harrison (1974) state:
Small companies are hit harder by taxation, face higher investigation costs for
loans, are generally less well informed on sources of finance, and are less able
to satisfy lo£in requirements, (p. 228)

Not only do small business owners face problems in finding external funding,
but they will often need to secure the business loans with personal assets. Ang, Lin,
and Tyler (1995) believe that these personal commitments cause leverage levels to
be overstated since the actual asset base should include both personal and business
assets.
As owner-manager businesses have no separation between the agent and
equity provider, we would expect that equity agency costs are zero. The ownership
structure means that the manager is motivated to increase his own equity value.
However, agency costs of debt are more acute for small firms, as owner-managers
have greater opportunities to consume perquisites and chaimel funds to them
selves. Higher agency costs are confirmed by Scherr, Sugrue, and Ward (1990),
who find that monitoring problems are more severe for small firms in assessing
and controlling managerial behavior. High monitoring costs of debt have meant
that lenders to small businesses are usually banks and trade creditors, as they are
more efficient at monitoring managerial behavior.^
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Second, while debt has higher monitoring costs for small firms, it may also
carry a lower tax advantage. The combined business and personal incomes of many
small business owners are often in the low end of the progressive tax schedules.
Thus in contrast to larger firms, taxes actually favor less not more debt for small
businesses. Day, Stoll and Whaley (1985) agree that the tax shield is less valuable
to small firms as they are generally less capital intensive and less profitable.
The smaller tax advantage is also balanced by higher direct and indirect bank
ruptcy costs. The concept of higher bankruptcy costs is supported by Bradbury and
Lloyd (1994), who discovered that direct bankruptcy costs are negatively related
to size. Bankruptcy also carries greater indirect costs to the small business owner,
such as the loss of self esteem, self employment, and personal assets.
Third, some theorists propose that small business managers follow a unique
financial objective function. Petty and Bygrave (1993) conclude that a firm’s
financial objective is largely dependent upon the stage of development of the busi
ness. While managers of larger firms appear to pursue a goal of wealth maximiza
tion, small business owners are more concerned with utility maximization. Ang
(1992) argues that small business managers are not only concerned with creating
wealth, but also with the preservation of control, the avoidance of accountability,
the preservation of self esteem, the security of self employment and the employ
ment of friends and family. Therefore, it is expected that these particular concerns
would be put at risk by a highly levered capital structure.
The owner-manager’s preoccupation with retaining control and avoiding
accountability may often limit the growth potential of a small business. McMahon
(1993) argues that the desire to maintain control causes owner-managers to mini
mize the use of outside financing, which in turn may severely limit the develop
ment of the enterprise. In fact, it was discovered by Davidsson (1989) that forty
percent of small business owners are not motivated by wealth to increase the size
of their business. The main two fears given for avoiding growth were the possibil
ity of a lack of control and a lower well-being of employees. Similarly, an investi
gation by the Australian National Investment Council (1995) concluded that:
Only two percent of Australian small businesses are growth firms currently seek
ing out equity (...) taking outside equity increases debt capacity (...) increases
growth but leads to shared control and increased accountability, (p. 19)

With debt incurring higher bankruptcy costs, lower tax advantages, and lower
agency advantages to small business owners, one might expect that small busi
nesses would have less leverage in comparison to larger firms. Norton (1990) con
firms this idea in a survey which found that small business managers have a greater
preference for zero debt and are unconcerned about target debt ratios in compari
son to larger firms.
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However, what we find in reality, is that a perceived lower advantage of debt
for small businesses does not appear to affect actual leverage ratios. Some studies
such as Pettit and Singer (1993), Brigham (1969), and Walker (1975) have found
that leverage is significantly higher for small firms. Similarly, in a study of 86,000
firms, Davidson and Dutia (1991) discovered that small businesses generally have
higher debt levels especially in the form of short term debt.^ In contrast, Remmers,
Stonehill, Wright and Beekhuisen (1974) concluded that size was not a determi
nant of the leverage ratio in manufacturing firms and Chen and Balke (1979) also
reported a similar result.
The apparent disagreement of these studies could be due to the difficulty of
measuring small business capital structure. A true market value for equity is very
hard to determine except perhaps at the time a business is sold. Ang (1992) points
out that the leverage ratio for small businesses can be biased due to debt acting like
“quasi equity” and certain asset and liability items being unreported. In addition, a
small business owner’s contributions such as low cost loans, low cost labor, and
free use of personal assets, can often cause equity to be understated.
From the above review of financial literature, it appears that small businesses
suffer from very high agency costs of debt and insignificant agency costs of inter
nal equity. Bankruptcy costs are also high and may completely outweigh a smaller
tax advantage of debt. Added to the fact that the owner-manager pursues a goal of
maximizing utility rather than wealth, one would expect that small businesses
would generally prefer to use lower levels of debt.
Certainly, if the agency costs of equity are insignificant and the agency costs
of debt are very high, one would expect that debt in a small business would actu
ally increase the combined agency costs in a small business. In fact, the entire role
of debt would differ in small businesses as they generally gain less from tax
shields, increased managerial efficiency and monitoring, and reduced asynunetrical information. Thus, we expect that the most important motivation for using debt
in a small business would be simply to provide much needed funds.
The Different Circumstances For IPO Firms
An initial public offering (IPO) provides firms with greater access to equity
funds, greater liquidity, and an avenue for significant growth. It is generally agreed
that IPOs are timed when stock prices are high and equity capital is cheap. Loughran & Ritter (1993) confirm this idea with a finding of low IPO stock returns,
which they documented as 2 % on average for the first two years in comparison to
15% for mature listed firms.^ This finding indicates that firms are being listed on
the stock exchange to take advantage of a low cost of equity.
Certainly, IPO firms are likely to have different characteristics in comparison
to mature-listed firms, and their capital structure is expected to be significantly dif
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ferent also. In fact, it may be optimal for IPO firms to maintain a conservative cap
ital structure for several reasons outlined below.
First, IPO firms may suffer from problems of asymmetrical information to a
lesser extent, as the underwriter’s involvement with the company may decrease the
information gap. Consequently, the underwriter often acts as a certifying agent and
disseminator of information. Therefore, the underwriter may absorb some of the
agency costs which would normally be incurred by investors, and as a result, the
process may lessen the monitoring advantage of debt.
Second, firms at the IPO stage are usually high growth firms needing capital to
fund future investments. If a firm is facing high growth opportunities then it would
probably be better to maintain a higher level of financial slack. Both Myers and
Majluf (1984) and Cornell and Shapiro (1988) agree that firms should try to main
tain a level of financial slack so that profitable investment opportunities are not
foregone. The large transaction costs for issuing equity, in terms of both invest
ment bankers fees and management effort, may also provide an incentive for IPO
firms to issue more equity than is inmiediately necessary.
Third, Leyland and Pyle (1977) conclude that a high proportion of equity
retained by insiders signals that insiders value the company’s prospects as high.
Therefore, IPO firms may initially use less debt in order to signal a high valuation
of the firm to the market.
Finally, young firms typically have much of their value represented by intan
gibles such as growth opportunities. The lower proportion of tangible assets will
discourage funding from debt holders and limit debt capacity. Myers (1977) sup
ports this idea and argues that debt holders lend less to firms with high growth
options because managers have an incentive to sub-optimally invest.
In summary, the listing stage of the business life cycle seems to occur when the
utility gained fi:om retaining control is outweighed by the low cost of equity, desire
for growth, benefit of greater liquidity, and need for additional financial slack. IPO
firms are less likely to benefit from the agency advantage of debt because the
underwriter may already act as a monitor and disseminator of information.
However, the initial public offering stage is where a firm experiences a greater
diffusion and liquidity of ownership. Agency theory predicts that with diffusion of
ownership, agency costs should increase, and as a result, we would expect IPO
firms to gradually take on increasing amounts of debt to counteract agency costs
and improve managerial efficiency.

m . EMPIRICAL TESTS
Small Businesses
In order to understand the role of debt at the small business stage we have
tested the leverage relationships that exist among a set of small owner-manager
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firms. In order to provide a true picture of small business capital structure and
obtain a market value for equity, we have used a list of owner-manager firms at the
time the business is sold.
We expect that debt will have no agency advantage to the owner-manager as
the manager will already act in a way to increase his own personal wealth. In fact,
debt is expected to decrease the total utility to the owner due to a loss of control,
added accountability, and an increase in personal risk. Thus, debt is anticipated to
have a negative agency advantage and to be used only when additional funds are
necessary.
Data
The first set of data was a list of 99 observations from 35 New Zealand (N.Z.)
small businesses which had been sold from 1988-1993. This data set was obtained
on a confidential basis from a number of New Zealand accounting firms. As the
sample size was considered to be smaller than optimal, a second set of data from
the United States (U.S.) was also studied. The U.S. data was private information
obtained from a broker. The data set consisted of 123 observations for sixty five
U.S. small businesses which had been sold from 1984 to 1991. This list was then
narrowed down to 50 observations from 35 firms because some of the financial
data was incomplete.
Methodology
To examine why small business managers use debt, leverage relationships
were determined using the Spearman’s rank correlation procedure. This form of
analysis is a non-parametric method which is more suitable for determining rela
tionships when the data is not normally distributed.
Leverage was calculated using the sale price of the business, for the reason that
financial statements usually do not accurately measure leverage in small busi
nesses. Table 1 shows the formulas for each of the variables.
Table 1
Formulas for Spearman’s Rank Analysis
Key

Variable

Formulas

LI
L2
t

Term leverage
Total leverage
Unlevered tax rate

s
f

Size
Future growth
opportunities
Sales Growth

Term liabilities / market equity + total debt
Total debt/ Market equity + Total debt
(Tax paid + Interest expense * Tax rate)
/Net income before tax, interest & depreciation.
Total assets
Market Equity: Book equity

g

% change in yearly sales
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Table 2
Small Business Coefficient Results for Each Variable
Variable
Tax rate
Size
Future Growth Opp
Sales Growth

US Term
Leverage
-.102
+.048
-.172
+.291**

US Total
Leverage
-.053
+.446***
-.084
+.334**

NZTerm
Leverage

NZ Total
Leverage

+.099
+.341**
-.061
+.059

+.248*
+.349**
.003
-.042

Note: * .10 level of sig., ** .05 level of sig.,*** .01 level of sig.

Results
The Speannan’s rank analysis identified a positive leverage relationship for
both size and sales growth. However, there was no evidence to suggest leverage
was related to tax rates or future growth options. Table 2 shows the results of the
Spearman’s rank analysis.
The positive correlation between leverage and size found for both U.S. and
N.Z. firms was very strong. This result is consistent with the work of Bradley and
Lloyd (1994) who found that bankruptcy costs decrease as a function of size result
ing in a lower optimal debt level for small firms. The finding is also consistent with
the finance gap theory and supports the argument that larger firms find external
funding cheaper and more available. In addition, the idea that the monitoring of
small firms is more costly to debt holders is also supported by a positive relation
ship with size.
Second, a significant positive relationship was found for sales growth with
both measures of leverage for U.S. firms. This finding is consistent with the peck
ing order theory and supports the idea that small businesses use debt when internal
funds become limited.
No relationship was found for the tax rate except for a positive correlation with
total leverage in small NZ businesses. Even so, this relationship was only signifi
cant at the .10 level. Consequently, the results suggest that the main advantage of
debt is not tax related for small businesses.
Conclusion
From the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that small firms gain an
insignificant tax and agency advantage from debt. Instead, a positive relationship
with sales growth points to the conclusion that debt is generally used out of neces
sity and is not voluntarily taken on to increase the firm’s performance. A positive
relationship with size supports the idea that agency costs of debt increase as the
size of the firm decreases. Therefore, in the light of extremely high agency costs of
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debt and no agency costs of internal equity, one could conclude that the agency
advantage of debt is in fact negative.
IPO Firms
We expect that the agency advantage of debt at the IPO stage is significant but
is lower in comparison to mature listed firms. Our reasoning is that the IPO process
may perform a similar role to debt in reducing asymmetrical information through
the involvement with underwriters. Managers may also have less inclination to
consume perquisites due to the high growth circumstances generally experienced
at IPO, which often reduce available cash flows.
Data
A Ust was made of all New Zealand companies which had listed on the stock
exchange between the period of 1985 and 1989. Annual financial report informa
tion was collected for all the 112 companies from the financial reports in the Datex
library files. Datex is a well respected provider of financial information of N.Z.
listed companies.
Methodology
To determine the value of leverage at the IPO stage, relationships between
leverage and underpricing were analyzed using the Spearman’s rank correlation
procedure. Leverage was measured in three ways using term liabiUties, interest
bearing debt, and total liabilities, as a percentage of total assets.
The observations were also divided into two groups; firms with and firms with
out term Uabihties. The underpricing for both groups was analyzed and the signif
icance of any differences was determined through the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
The Spearman’s Rank correlation procedure was used to examine leverage
relationships with four variables: the tax shield, size, future growth opportunities,
and sales growth. The variables were calculated using the same formula as shown
in Table 1 for small businesses, with the exception that leverage was determined
using book values. Book values were seen as a fair estimate because it is assumed
that the auditing of listed companies would increase the accuracy of financial data.
Results
The analysis found that:
• underpricing was positively related to leverage
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Table 3
Underpricing Relationships with Three Measures of Leverage
Lx>ng Term Leverage

Total Leverage

Interest Bearing
Leverage

+.222
2.34***

+.365
3.84***

+.328
3.45***

Coefficient
Z value

Note: ***significant at the .01 level

Table 4
Differences for Long Term Leverage
Underpricing
average
median
standard deviation

Firms Without Term Liabilities

Firms With Term Liabilities

46.14%
2%
83.47%

56.21%
18.67%
99.1%

• higher underpricing was experienced by firms with term liabilities
• positive leverage relationships exist for size and tax rates
First, the Spearman’s rank analysis showed that strong positive relationships
were found for underpricing and all three measures of leverage as seen in Table 3.
In other words, highly levered IPO stocks have been more underpriced in the
period from 1985 to 1989.
When the data was divided into two groups, those companies with term liabil
ities were on average more underpriced than companies without term liabilities as
shown in Table 4. The median underpricing was particularly higher for firms with
term liabilities.
Both T tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests did not show that the differences in
the two groups of firms were significant to point to differences in the mean of the
two populations, so one can not propose that the difference in underpricing would
continue to be evident in the 1990s. However, the fact that Spearman’s rank anal
ysis found a relationship between leverage and term liabilities suggests that debt at
the IPO stage is valued by the market.
The Spearman’s rank analysis also showed that a significant positive relation
ship existed for both size and the unlevered tax shield at the IPO stage. But, as
shown in Table 5, no relationship was found for sales growth or future growth
opportunities.
Conclusion
The positive relationship between leverage and the unlevered tax shield sug
gests that the principal benefit of debt is tax related at the IPO stage. The strong
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Table 5
Coefficient results from Spearman’s rank analysis
Variable

Ipo Stage
Leverage Coefficient

Tax shield
Size
Future growth opportunities
Sales growth
Note:

.243**
.302***
.115
-.041

* .10 level o f significance, ** .05 level o f significance, *** .01 level of significance

positive relationship with size also suggests that bankruptcy costs are relevant and
supports the balancing theory.
The strong tax relationship with leverage may be apparent only because debt
is not being used by managers for other purposes, such as reducing agency costs.
This argument points to the conclusion that the agency advantage of debt is insig
nificant due to the IPO providing similar monitoring and motivating benefits of
debt. As mentioned earlier, the IPO process often reduces asymmetrical informa
tion and increases monitoring through involvement with underwriters. The IPO
may also have a restructuring or “shake up” effect, which may pressure manage
ment in the same way that debt increases efficiency in mature listed businesses.
Nevertheless, the fact that leverage is positively related to underpricing sug
gests that the market still values leverage as a tool for reducing agency costs in the
future. The greater level of underpricing for levered stocks may mean that the mar
ket values debt in a firm’s capital structure more than investment bankers have
realized. In contrast, it is highly likely that investment bankers plan for the higher
underpricing as a compensation for greater risk. The market possibly values debt
as a means of reducing agency costs in the future and as a tool to ensure that man
agers are more likely to maximize shareholder wealth.
Mature Listed Businesses
It is expected that the role of debt in mature listed businesses is far from a sim
ple case of providing a source of funds. With high asymmetrical information
between investors and managers, high diffusion of ownership, and high agency
costs, we expect the role of debt will be complex at this stage. We expect that listed
companies will gradually increase the debt ratio from the IPO to mature listed
stage in order to benefit from the agency advantage of debt.
Data
Financial information was collected for all New Zealand companies which
Usted on the stock exchange between 1980 and 1989, and stayed listed for at least
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five years. Various financial measures were recorded for the 70 companies in the
year of IPO and then again five years after listing.
Method
The actual difference in shareholder’s equity was calculated for each year
from IPO to five years after listing. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was performed
to determine the significance of the changes.
Relationships for leverage at the five year stage were then examined using the
Spearman’s rank correlation procedure. The variables were calculated in the same
way as in the IPO rank analysis.
Results
The analysis found:
•
•
•
•

an increase in leverage from year one to year five of listing
a negative relationship between leverage and future growth opportunities
an increase in total assets from the IPO to mature listed stage
a decrease in sales growth from the IPO to mature listed stage

First, leverage was found to significantly increase over the five years. On aver
age, an extra 2 1 % of total assets were funded by debt in the fifth year of listing
compared to in the IPO year. The average and median difference in leverage is
Table 6
Difference in leverage from IPO year
Absolute dijference in leverage from year one of listing to:
average
median

year 2

year 3

year 4

year 5

6.07%
2.80%

12.61%
6.80%

16.90%
11.62%

21.68%
8.99%

Table 7
Coefficient Results from Spearman’s Rank Analysis
Variable
Tax shield
Size
Future grov^th opportunities
Sales growth

Note: **05 level of significance.

Mature Listed
Leverage Coefficient

.159
.063
-.207**

-.046
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Table 8
Changes in Total Assets and Sales Growth
Sales Growth

Total Assets (000)

average
median

IPO

5year

absolute
difference

IPO

5year

absolute
difference

266,945
11,007

420,310
19,359

153,364
1,966

236%
44%

35%
221%

-201%
-45%

shown in Table 6 . A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that the increase in
leverage was significant at the . 0 1 level.
A negative relationship for future growth opportunities was the only signifi
cant leverage relationship found. Table 7 shows the leverage coefficients for each
variable determined by the Spearman’s rank analysis.
Third, the analysis found that total assets significantly increase over the 5- year
period measured, as shown in Table 8 . This result suggests that an unlisted firm’s
growth may often be constrained by a lack of funds and that listing enables a firm
to pursue a number of investment opportunities.
This idea is further supported by the finding that sales growth significantly
decreased from the IPO to the mature listed stage. Thus, listing on the stock
exchange appears to accompany a significant increase in sales, which then gener
ally decreases as the business matures. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that
the differences are significant at the . 0 1 level.
Conclusion
From the results of the analysis, it is evident that debt increases considerably
in the five years after listing. One could argue that increased leverage is caused by
the adaptation to a new ownership structure which involves greater owner-manager separation and higher agency costs. Thus, the agency advantage of debt
appears very strong.
The lower correlation for the tax shield suggests that the agency advantage of
debt has outweighed the tax and bankruptcy cost relationship which was very
strong at the IPO stage. Therefore, the agency benefit of debt appears to have much
significance at the mature listed stage.
The negative leverage correlation with future growth opportunities shows that
conservative capital structures exist at the mature listed stage for firms with high
growth options. While maintaining a low level of financial slack is seen as advan
tageous to increasing managerial efficiency, there is also an argument for firms
with high growth options to maintain enough financial slack so that profitable
investment opportunities can be easily invested in. Therefore, it appears that debt
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has a high advantage for mature-listed firms with the exception of firms needing
considerable financial slack for future growth.
The negative correlation may also point to managers being concerned with
reducing the cost of capital by issuing the least costly security available. Thus, if a
firm has a high market to book value through high growth opportunities, then man
agers are more likely to issue equity to take advantage of a lower relative cost of
financing.
The findings of high growth at the IPO stage suggest that listing on the stock
exchange allows a firm to experience its true growth potential, which may have
been constrained by the small business finance gap. Additionally, BPO firms expe
riencing high growth may also suffer from limited cashflow which will lessen the
opportunities for managers to consume perks, and thus lessen the agency advan
tage of debt.
Table 9
Spearman’s Rank Coefficients for Total Leverage
Variable
Tax shield
size
future growth
opportunities
sales growth

US Small
Business

NZ Small
Business

-.053
,446***

.248*
.349**
.003

.084
.334**

-.042

SYears After
Listing

IPO
Stage
.243**
302***
.115

.159
.063
-.207**
-.046

-.041

Note: *.10 level o f significance, **.05 level o f significance, ***.01 level o f significance

Significant leverage relationships

Btax shield
■s iz e
□fu tu re growth opportunities
O sales growth

-0.3

Figure 1
Bar Graph of Leverage Relationships Determined by Empirical Analysis
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IV. SUMMARY
The analysis shows that leverage relationships vary over the firm life cycle. Table
9 summarizes the results from the Spearman’s rank analysis for all three stages.
As Figure 1 illustrates, leverage appears to be related to size and sales growth
at the small firm stage. At the IPO stage the tax and size relationship is very high.
At the mature listed stage leverage appears to be only correlated with future
growth options suggesting that the agency advantage of debt has outweighed the
tax shield benefits.
The following results were also found:
• Higher underpricing for highly levered stocks;
• An increase in leverage and size from IPO to mature listed stage; and
• Significantly higher sales growth at the IPO stage.
V. CONCLUSION
The findings give evidence to conclude that the agency advantage of debt does
vary from the small, to the IPO, to the mature-listed stage of the firm life-cycle.
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the debt advantage over the three stages.
At the small business stage, debt appears to have a negative agency advantage
due to the negligible agency costs of equity and high agency costs of debt. The eviAaencv advantage of debt

strong

significant

small

rzTZi..
IPO

mature-listed

negative

Figure 2
The Change in the Advantage of Debt Over the Firm Life Cycle
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Table 10
Conclusion Summary
Small
agency benefit of
debt
agency costs
tax benefit of debt

main explaining
theory
probable
considerations in
using debt

IPO

Mature Listed

negative

significant

strong

nil for internal equity
very high for debt
low

partly absorbed by
underwriter
high

very high

pecking order theory

balancing theory

high (but with many
other
debt considerations)
agency theory

maximize total utility

increase shareholder
wealth, reduce
costs of financing

increase shareholder
wealth, reduce costs of
financing

dence shows that small firms gain an insignificant agency and tax advantage from
debt. Instead, the findings point to debt being used in response to a shortage of
internal funds.
At the IPO stage, the IPO process performs a similar role to debt in reducing
agency costs, and consequently, debt loses much of its agency advantage. Instead,
the tax advantage of debt appears to be extremely significant in determining an
IPO firm’s optimal debt level.
The mature-Usted stage is associated with an increase in debt levels which
appear to be in response to a new ownership structure. It appears that there is a very
strong agency advantage of debt which surpasses the tax advantage. However, if a
firm’s growth options are high, this agency advantage appears to be outweighed by
the need to maintain financial slack.
Thus, one can conclude that if a firm follows a life cycle fi:om a small business
to an IPO stage, to a mature listed stage, it is likely to experience increasing agency
advantages of debt. Further studies examining how managers decide on a firm’s
optimal debt level would be useful in increasing the understanding of the shifting
advantage of debt.
NOTES
1.

See Ross (1977), Copeland and Lee (1991) and Masulis (1983) for further details of the informa-

2.

tion hypothesis
Research by Shah (1994) also confirms that increasing a firm’s leverage generally lowers an

3.

investor’s assessment o f the firm’s risk.
Empirical evidence on small business capital structure is limited to a few studies such as Walker
and Petty (1978) and Day, Stoll and Whaley (1985) and Norton (1990).
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4.
5.
6.
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The efficient monitoring idea may explain why studies such as Davidson & Dutia (1991) have
found that small businesses have more short term debt.
Gupta (1969) Horrigan (1965) and Walker and Petty (1978) have also produced similar results.
Aggarwal and Rivdi (1990) also observed poor performance in the first year o f listing. Similarly,
Ibbotson (1975) documented periods of high initial returns and high volume “hot issue” markets.
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